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Regulating “Too Big to Fail”
Kent Smetters AND Christopher Pericak
In July 2012, HSBC Holdings, Europe’s largest bank, was
accused in a U.S. Senate report of laundering monies for Saudi
Arabian terrorists, Mexican drug cartels and rogue regimes in
North Korea and Cuba.
In December 2012, the firm agreed to a
record $1.9 billion fine but escaped criminal
prosecution from U.S. Attorney General
Eric Holder. In withholding criminal
charges, prosecutors, in part, cited fear of
“collateral consequences” of disrupting an
international bank that is tightly tied to
almost seven dozen economies throughout
the world where HSBC operates. In sharp
response, Oregon Senator Merkley claimed
that the Justice Department “firmly set the
precedent that no bank, bank employee, or
bank executive can be prosecuted even for
serious criminal actions if that bank is a
large, systemically important institution.”2
Indeed, HSBC’s record fine was equal to
only about one month of earnings.
Despite the passage of the 2010 DoddFrank Act, U.S. regulators remain petrified
of Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs). These are entities that are
widely viewed as “too big to fail” because of

their possible contagion effects on the rest of
the financial markets.3 Hundreds of billions
of taxpayers’ dollars have been spent bailing
out many of these SIFIs. And, while taxpayers might largely get paid back for their help
in some of these cases, they will be underpaid for the risk they have borne.
The federal government added to the
disorder by establishing its own track record
of supporting big bailouts. The counterparties of AIG were made whole for their
losses—100 cents on the dollar—despite
being sophisticated institutions that are
better positioned to underwrite their own
counterparty risks, unlike the disinterested
taxpayers who ultimately bore those risks.
Bondholders for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were also made whole with at
least $291 billion of taxpayers’ money.4 The
obligations for just these two entities totaled
more than $5 trillion, equal to half of all
publicly-held debt when the federal govern-
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ment agreed to inherit their liabilities in the
fall of 2008.
The Dodd-Frank Act tries to address
some of these issues by forming a foundation that empowers the nation’s key financial
regulators to implement new rules—many
of which still need to be enacted. Nonetheless, SIFIs still can safely rely upon taxpayers
to bear some of the downside risk of their
financial decisions while private stakeholders continue to enjoy the potential upside.
As Federal Reserve Governor Jeremy Stein
recently argued, “[W ]e are quite a way from
having fully solved the policy problems associated with SIFIs.” In particular, “the market
still appears to attach some probability to
the government bailing out the creditors of
a SIFI; this can be seen in the ratings uplift
granted to large banks based on the ratings
agencies’ assessment of the probability of
government support.” 5
One of the main problems with the
Dodd-Frank Act is that it focuses on symptoms, like excessive risk taking, rather than
on the root causes related to the underlying
incentives. The real question, in examining
the recent financial crisis, is why the private
actors were not properly incented by their own
self-interested pursuit of profit to eliminate the
inefficiencies that led to their excessive risk taking. Without a solid framework for understanding the root causes of their behavior,
regulation quickly becomes policy Whac-AMole, a continuous losing battle that focuses
on responding defensively to ever-changing
symptoms. This reactionary approach to
regulation cannot lay the real groundwork
for mitigating future disasters and actually
can cause economic harm by raising costs
and reducing productive activity.
This brief summarizes “an economist
way of thinking” about regulating SIFIs,
founded on the concept of market failures.
If there were no market failures, regulation
would not be needed and likely would be
misguided. But market failures do happen.
Without an understanding of the core mar-
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The Market Failures
For starters, we must be clear about what
we mean by a “market failure.” Economists
distinguish between reasonable risk-taking
and risk-taking that is inefficient ex-ante.
For example, did the CEO take a risk that
her shareholders would have approved had
they been fully informed? Or, did the CEO
simply gamble because she profited disproportionately from the upside in the form
of stock options? The former is simply bad
luck, the latter a market failure.
Our analysis has identified four key
market failures facing the financial system.
I. Bounded Rationality (in particular,
a form known as “disaster myopia”) occurs
when low probability events or events with
little history are ignored in the face of considerable complexity costs. The possibility of
a 9/11 terrorist attack, for example, became
more obvious in hindsight. Ignoring low
probability events is rational if the associated
severity is low, since there are costs associ-

ated with planning for every possible event.
It becomes a problem, however, when those
events also have a large severity of loss: that’s
the reason why people buy house insurance
even though the chance of a significant loss
is small. There is ample evidence that prior
to the financial crisis, CEO’s, CIO’s, CFO’s
and other key employees of investment
firms, insurers and other financial intermediaries took large risks they didn’t understand.
Of course, today, those private actors better
appreciate these risks. However, they can
continue to ignore these risks if they face
little cost of being wrong because the government has their backs. Indeed, bounded
rationality typically amplifies another market failure, adverse selection.
II. Adverse Selection (in this context)
occurs when securities sellers have better
information about the risk of their products than buyers do. During the financial
crisis, many contracts were greatly mispriced relative to their default risk, and not
just in hindsight. “Lemons” (higher risk
securities) were being successfully sold as
“cherries” (lower risk). The evidence suggests
that adverse selection didn’t act alone but
exploited the bounded rationality of key decision makers who misjudged the odds and
severities. Think of bounded rationality as
the needle and adverse selection as the toxic
drug.
III. A Samaritan’s Dilemma, an
expression coined by Nobel laureate James
Buchanan, is a type of moral hazard that
occurs when a party takes advantage of the
protection offered by (usually) the government, because the government, like the
Good Samaritan, can’t credibly commit to
not bailing out after a loss. Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, although technically
private entities, benefitted from the implicit
Congressional protection provided to their
bondholders. In exchange, Fannie and Freddie responded to federal pressure to increase
homeownership by buying “Alternative
A” mortgages and substantial amounts of
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ket failures that actually exist, regulation will
be missing or slapdash. A framework built
on market failures provides a foundation
for thinking critically and finding the right
policy solutions.
We then use this framework to analyze the current regulatory environment.
While Dodd-Frank does make a couple of
important key changes consistent with our
framework, the world remains vulnerable.
Finally, we show how a fairly simple and
actionable regulatory model, where reverse
convertible debt generates market signals to
help realign incentives, can be implemented
to address most of these market failures. This
illustrative regulatory model transfers most
of the risk efficiently back to the private parties in proper order of their access to information and their roles and responsibilities:
executives, shareholders, bondholders, and
then counterparties. The risk to taxpayers is
substantially reduced.
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An exact definition of a SIFI has not yet been deter-
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FIGURE 1: housing bubble and financial crisis caused by four market failures
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securitized loans. To finance these operations, both entities were able to borrow at
low rates and carry substantial amounts of
leverage, often 40 - 70 times their equity,
and much higher if you count the face
value of the guarantees that they extended.
The bailout of the bondholders of both
institutions only enhanced the Samaritan’s
Dilemma. The government also bailed out
many financial institutions that were not
previously viewed as having this implicit
guarantee, only adding to the Dilemma.
IV. A Principal-Agent Problem
exists when an agent who is employed by a
principal does not act in the principal’s best
interest. Executives don’t always maximize
shareholder value if the executives’ actions
are hard to monitor. Likewise, salespeople
working on commission might increase sales
regardless of costs. Large firms are especially difficult to risk manage. A single small
unit in AIG collapsed the entire company;
similar events occurred previously at Barings
and other firms. Such diseconomies of scale
are challenging for non-key personnel and
shareholders to ascertain before actual losses
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(5) Samaritan’s Dilemma

• Internal models assume housing prices will
continue to increase2
• Employees take excessive risk for shortterm gain despite instead of pursuing
shareholders’ long term interests3

emerge. In the meantime, a larger firm affords
generous compensation to those who run it.
Figure 1 summarizes the role that each
market failure played in the 2008 financial
crisis. While each market failure remains
important today, the Samaritan’s Dilemma
is the most challenging; indeed, all major G20
countries have all but given up on the pretense
that they won’t bail out SIFIs after ruin.

The Dodd-Frank Act
Leaves America and the
World Exposed
The Dodd-Frank Act may appear to address
some of the market failures illustrated above.
However, by focusing on symptoms instead
of root causes, Dodd-Frank leaves much
work to be done.

Bounded Rationality and
Adverse Selection
Some of Dodd-Frank’s most successful
policies come from enhancing information and lowering the cost of obtaining it,
thereby reducing bounded rationality and

adverse selection.6 First, the Act attempts to
formalize the derivatives trading process by
encouraging that more trades be executed
through clearinghouses and exchanges, where
a third party provides more due diligence and
engages in more risk management. In practice, though, loopholes and clever industry
workarounds are emerging.7 Second, the Act
also reduces the role of the credit rating agencies by creating more competition and reducing the SEC’s and Federal Reserve’s reliance
on ratings for determining capital buffers
and collateral. There is little evidence that
the standard Moody’s-S&P-Fitch oligopoly,
though, is facing any serious competition.
Moreover, coordination with Basel III’s reliance on ratings remains unresolved. Third, the
Act mandates using stress tests to evaluate
risk across financial institutions. But, so far,
those tests emphasize worst-case scenarios,
and their methodology is not transparent to
outside parties, reducing their effectiveness.

The Samaritan’s Dilemma
Dodd-Frank is fairly weak when it comes to
dealing with the Samaritan’s Dilemma. First,
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the Act requires SIFIs to design and regularly update their “living wills”—their own
funeral instructions—in order to expedite
their liquidation upon failure. In theory, an
orderly liquidation process quickly unlocks
remaining capital to reduce the cascading
nature of defaults across financial institutions. A living will also clearly identifies
subordinated stakeholders who are most at
risk, giving them more incentive to closely
monitor the SIFI’s risks. Still, much of the
Samaritan’s Dilemma problem remains:
counterparties, bondholders and maybe even
some equity owners can depend, in full or
in part, on the government backdrop and
therefore are less likely to engage in due
diligence and risk management. Moreover, initial drafts of living wills were due
last summer and fell short of the Federal
Reserve’s and FDIC’s expectations.8 They
are also hard to coordinate across international legal standards.9
Second, the emergency lending powers
of the Federal Reserve have been restricted
to assisting a bank’s liquidity rather than
supporting an insolvent institution.10
Instead, a bailout requires the backing of the
new Financial Stability Oversight Council
(FSOC), representing a more diverse set
of opinions of the nation’s largest federal
regulators. In fact, many actions require
supermajority support.11 In theory, therefore, a SIFI can’t count on being bailed out,
thereby being allowed to fail like Lehman
(although presumably not in the same
manner). Such a random or “mixed strategy” is indeed often optimal in the presence of moral hazard. In practice, however,
a supermajority of FSOC members would
likely support a bailout of an institution that
has already been designated as a SIFI by
the G20. Most of the voting members are
presidential appointments anyway, and so
they would likely pay attention to the wishes
of the Administration.
Third, the so-called “Volcker Rule,”
which garnered significant media attention,
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attempts to prohibit a bank from trading
for its own account (“proprietary trading”),
rather than trading on a client’s behalf. The
thrust of the Rule is that “prop desks” don’t
serve a regular business purpose and so
taxpayers should not be exposed to seemingly personal bets tucked underneath the
too-big-to-fail implicit guarantee. However, a well-functioning bank dealer doesn’t
simply pass through a client’s risk, like a
pure broker, to an outside counterparty. It
pools clients’ idiosyncratic risks, bringing
to the market the remainder that it can sell
at a price less than its internal risk cost. It’s
nearly impossible to determine at the margin when that remainder constitutes trading
for the bank’s own interests or a client’s.
Even government regulators can’t apparently
agree on how to detect a violation, delaying the Rule’s actual implementation. Even
though obvious violations could be detected,
the Rule, including its watered down implementation in Senate conference, will mainly
only impact a few large banks yet increase
compliance costs for all.12
Fourth, the Act requires the study of
additional firm capital to augment a firm’s
ability to suffer a loss, including contingent
capital (discussed more below) and GAAPbased capital requirements, which follow
quarterly accounting statements. But the Act
stops short of requiring capital requirements
to reflect the market’s valuation of on- and
off-balance sheet assets and liabilities and
contingencies.

The Principal-Agent Problem
Dodd-Frank also does very little to address
principal-agent problems. First, to deal with
the conflicts of interest that are inherent
in contract sellers paying for their own
credit ratings, the Act now makes credit
rating agencies just as liable as any other
“expert,” such as the firm’s auditor. Moreover, it requires that credit agencies include
an attestation in any credit rating that they
were not influenced “by any other busi-

ness activities” and also requires agencies to
create informational barriers between their
marketing departments and their expert raters. But the Act does not ban unrelated consulting. Moreover, sellers still pay for their
own ratings, which is an almost unavoidable
conflict of interest in the modern era where
information on ratings can be easily shared.
Second, to deal with principal-agent
problems between firm employees and
shareholders, the Act enhances the executive “clawback” provisions already found in
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, requiring
that firms seek repayment from any current
or former executive of any incentive-based
compensation paid during the three-year
period preceding a “material noncompliance.” However, executives are still incented
to take big bets that can earn them nice
bonuses, provided that such actions are
revealed in accounting statements, which are
often challenging for the market to understand. In fact, executives would only have to
return their bonuses if their bets fail, rather
than suffer a large loss like their shareholders—and, even then, only if “material noncompliance” can be proven, potentially litigated.

Aligning Incentives with
Reverse Convertible Debt
The most effective regulatory policy aligns
the incentives of each stakeholder according to his or her access to information and
responsibilities. Most current regulatory
discussions thus far have focused on building a SIFI’s capital base as a buffer against
losses and contagion. Of the different types
of capital, contingent capital is likely to be the
most effective at aligning incentives because
its price can be highly responsive to the
specific actions taken by a SIFI. But it must
be implemented correctly to be effective.

Contingent Capital
Contingent capital is debt that can convert to equity when a firm is in trouble.

See William C. Dudley, “Some Lessons from the Crisis,”
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June 3, 2011. However, Tarullo later seems to be more
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FSOC issued its report and “recommends that contingent

“Report to Congress on Study of a Contingent Capital

One particular type is a reverse convertible
(debenture). The more familiar standard
convertible gives the debt holder the option
to convert into a predetermined number of
company shares, an action normally taken as
the share price increases. A reverse convertible, by contrast, gives the company the right
to force this conversion, an action usually
taken as the share price declines. A reverse
convertible, therefore, effectively reduces the
debt load during challenging financial times.
While used by some European banks in the
past, reverse convertibles are uncommon in the
U.S., where the tax treatement is less clear.
The policy goal of contingent capital
is to protect taxpayers by allowing SIFIs to
recapitalize during times of economic distress, known as a “bail in.” Contingent capital also gives the broad base of shareholders
strong incentives to push for corrective actions
before the trigger point to avoid dilution.13
Among its 2319 pages, the Dodd-Frank
Act requires that regulators study “contingent capital” in more detail, but it doesn’t
go much further. Federal Reserve Governor
Daniel K. Tarullo, who serves as the Fed’s
point person for non-consumer financial
regulation, recently stated that “for all the
attention paid to [contingent capital] in the
last few years, it is even now not clear as a
practical matter that an instrument can be
developed which would be cheaper than
common equity but still structured so as to
convert in a timely, reliable fashion.”14 Under
Dodd-Frank, the Federal Reserve has until
July 22, 2014, to suggest a firm position.
Until then, U.S. law remains fairly silent on
contingent capital.
The G20’s Financial Stability Board,
though, is studying contingent capital in
more detail. One idea being discussed is that
a top holding company of the SIFI would
amass a large amount of long-term unsecured debt. A “single entry” regulator in each
country would have the power to force the
conversion to equity as part of liquidation,
thereby providing some buffer to taxpayers.
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In the U.S., this role would likely fall to the
FDIC under the orderly liquidation powers
granted to it by Dodd-Frank.15 As currently
being discussed, though, this contingent
capital does not address Governor Tarullo’s
concern about conversion occurring in a
“timely, reliable fashion.”16 Instead, its
objective is to mainly protect taxpayers from
losses from a “gone concern” rather than to
support a “going concern.” Furthermore, its
price also would not serve as a quality early
warning signal to policymakers or be the
basis for pegging various pre-failure incentives.

“A reactionary approach to
regulation cannot lay the real
groundwork for mitigating
future disasters.”

Characteristics of Optimal
Contingent Capital
The optimal implementation of contingent
capital would: (I) allow market prices to
help predict a failure early enough to help
avoid a liquidity crisis, (II) produce a pure
signal that is not distorted by endogenous
government actions themselves (including
the bail-in itself ), (III) be specific to a SIFI’s
own actions and (IV ) promote consistency
across borders. Let’s briefly consider each
criterion in turn.
(I) Without harnessing the power of
market prices, the various regulatory bodies
would have to be well informed, coordinated
and proactive. The competitive market,
in contrast, is typically faster and more
accurate. Regulators, for example, entered
Bear Sterns only days before it would have
defaulted; in contrast, its share price actually
fell long before. The credit rating agencies don’t
do much better. Their ratings, for example,
often substantially lag credit default spreads
for sovereign debt, which explains why credit

downgrades often have little impact.
(II) Any pure signal also should not be
contaminated by the regulators’ decisions or
the bail-in action. A SIFI’s standard bond
yield, or credit default swap risk premium
trading on those bonds, therefore is not
a good pick for the trigger that decides
when to convert the contingent capital into
equity.17 At a minimum, those prices are
noisy, since they would capitalize expected
government action.18 When government
action is highly likely, focusing on those
instruments could even lead to an indeterminacy of government action. The firm’s
share price, while a potential contender, is
also at least somewhat distorted by government action and the potential of the bail-in
itself.19 Instead, the price signal should track
an instrument that is also subordinate to government help and even the contingent capital.
(III) Ultimately, getting an early and
pure signal should be part of a structure that
incentivizes each SIFI to be prudent. This
is an area where Basel III, while improving
the quality of capital, falls short. Most of the
required capital in Basel is a constant fraction of equity or tied to a measure of riskweighted assets. But a significant amount of
variation can occur within each risk bucket,
thereby allowing for substantial amounts
of moral hazard in the presence of the
government guarantee.20 Additional forms
of capital, including countercyclical capital
and a “SIFI surcharge” are discussed below;
while they can likely play a role in reform,
they also fail to align marginal incentives.
(IV) Having a consistent cross-border
standard is also important in order to not
create competitive advantages for SIFIs who
“game” the market failures. As it currently
stands, the existing and simpler Basel regulations have not been consistently applied
across countries. In Congressional testimony,
Governor Tarullo argued, “Despite extensive
sharing of information on supervisory practices, the Basel Committee has, over the years,
found it difficult to achieve . . . rigorous and
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FIGURE 2: ILLUSTRATIVE USE OF REVERSE CONVERTIBLE DEBT AS EARLY WARNING SIGNALS
Reverse Convertibles can be an integrated part of a comprehensive regulatory package addressing market failures
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Illustrative Use of Reverse
Convertible Debt as Integrated
Part of Regulatory Reform
One such regulatory structure using contingent capital is illustrated in Figure 2. During
normal economic times, SIFIs would sell
unsecured contingent capital to the open
market that is subordinate to the firm’s bond
holders and most other claims. To be concrete, we’ll think of these contracts as reverse
convertibles, although the exact nomenclature is unimportant.
SIFIs would be required to sell these
contracts in addition to the other potential
capital requirements of Basel III, including

risk-weighted capital, a countercyclical buffer, and a capital “SIFI surcharge.” The exact
amount of reverse convertibles required
to be sold would, at a minimum, be set to
equalize the average cost of capital between
the SIFI and non-SIFIs during normal
times, as SIFIs will likely continue to enjoy
a lower cost of capital in the presence of the
Samaritan’s Dilemma, even post-Basel III.
Of course, since the larger interest paid on
the reverse convertible is in exchange for the
firm’s option to recapitalize, the equalization
of the cost of capital is a lower bound. In
practice, a large share of the firm debt would
be required to be held in the form of reverse
convertibles to reduce any SIFI advantage.
SIFIs then would be required to run a
battery of standardized stress tests. These
testing suites would be updated regularly
by the appropriate regulator in the United
States, likely the Federal Reserve and SEC
working together. Internally, SIFIs could
automate many of these tests, much like
how eBay or Facebook routinely runs a large
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• Counterparties take a haircut or total loss
• Fired

• Repayment of last two years of
compensation unless recently hired

consistent application of those rules by supervisors and firms across countries.”21Achieving
consistent application will become only
harder, even with peer review, as regulators’ rules move toward even more complex
bank-specific capital standards. In contrast,
markets are highly incented to make such
judgments.

• Financial Stability Oversight Council
Key employees hit more

Key employees hit more
• Key employee look back, discretionary

Voluntary actions

4.	Incentivize Counterparties,
Protect Taxpayers
Extreme Cases Require
Committee Decision

Government Intervention to
Preserve Liquidity

• Contingent capital converted to equity

• Suspend dividends

fsoc identifies extreme contagion

• SEC-enforced temporary bans from
similar duties
• Criminal probe if fiduciary duties grossly
violated and misleading stress tests

suite of automated “unit,” “regression,” and
“penetration” tests on its code base.
Unlike the current bank stress tests
conducted in the United States, however, we
envision that stress tests would be standardized, extensive, and public. Arguments made
by SIFIs for keeping stress test results secret
seem to have more to do with protecting
executives and rent seeking than safeguarding intellectual secrets. Indeed, stress tests
in Europe have become more extensive
over time. But if U.S. regulators were truly
concerned about these issues or the costs
associated with stress tests, the tests could
be broken up into multiple and conditional
testing suites, including “Level 1” (L1) tests
during normal times and more detailed
“Level 2” (L2) tests performed only after
negative market signals, as shown in
Figure 2.
Getting the right market signal is critical for measuring a SIFI’s risk of default. As
noted earlier, a reverse convertible note must
offer a higher yield than the bank’s senior

Institutions with Contingent Capital Certificates,” Working

examined a trigger in the presence of a likely government

The distortion to the share price by the anticipated bail-in

the contingent capital because its conversion will dilute

Paper (University of Florida, 2009) argues for the benefit

backstop.

will be greatest at a low share price. Suresh Sundar-

shareholders even more. See the Federal Reserve Bank

See Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, Game Theory

esan and Zhenyu Wang also argue that, even without

of New York, “Design of Contingent Capital with Stock

Banks Fail, reviews various triggers, although he does

(MIT Press, 2000), pp. 17-18. In the setting herein, the

additional government action, the conversion of the

Price Trigger for Conversion,” Staff Report 448, 2010.

not settle on one. The literature has also discussed the

government’s actions should be contingent on a negative

contingent capital itself could lead to a downward spiral

Charles Calomiris and Richard Herring, in “Why and How

potential of market manipulation (e.g., “bear runs”) to

signal, but the market would not produce this signal if it

in share price: if the market believes that the SIFI is in

to Design a Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement,”

manipulate various triggers. But the literature has not

is confident that the government will help.

trouble, the share price will fall by even more than without

argue that their approach to an equity-based trigger is

a single trigger based on firm’s equity. Duffie, How Big
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standard debt because the note will be converted to equity when the SIFI is performing poorly. The difference between these
two yields is a relative risk premium that
indicates the value for this added risk on top
of the firm’s normal risk. This risk premium,
however, is not pure enough of a signal for
the conversion trigger, since a severe default
could impact the yield paid by the senior
debt as well, unless it were fully protected by
government action.
Instead, a “conversion swap” market
that tracks the conversion of these reverse
convertibles into equity would need to arise.
After a conversion of the contingent debt
to equity, the seller of the conversion swap
would take delivery of the underlying equity
in exchange for making the originallypromised bond payments. Unlike credit
default swaps trading on senior debt, the
volume in this new conversion swap market
should be robust for two reasons. First, even
equity investors would be attracted to the
potential of buying equity “on the cheap” if
the risk premium of a conversion swap rose
to an inefficient large level. To ensure that
the market has sufficient time to respond to
even a potential “bear run” that artificially
inflates the risk premium, we assume that
the conversion of the contingent debt to
equity only happens after the risk premium
exceeds a certain level (6% in our example)
for a given time threshold (30 days). Second,
the ability to insure the reverse convertibles
with swaps should let large institutional
investors such as insurance companies hold
the reverse convertibles as reserves. The
combination of reverse convertibles and the
swaps trading on them then should support
a large demand for each.
The spread on these conversion swaps
therefore would be based on the fundamental outlook of the bank’s solvency and serve
as a pure early warning signal to regulators.
If the risk spread exceeded some threshold
(shown as 6% in Figure 2, for the sake of
concreteness) some minimal actions to pre-

serve capital, falling on executives, are taken
along with additional stress tests and voluntary actions by the firm to restore capital
to regulated minimums. If the spread stays
above the threshold for a period of time
(say 30 days) then additional actions are
taken that dilute shareholders are mandatory,
including conversion of contingent capital
into equity. If still required, additional equity
offerings are made.22
Post-conversion, the role of regulators
is necessarily discretionary. The Federal
Reserve may make some limited investment,
in exchange for preferred shares, if they
believe that default of non-contingent debt
could result in liquidity problems; if those
shares are not paid off within a reasonable
period then the Federal Reserve would
sell them in the open market and buyers
naturally would retain the option to convert
to common. However, the size of the Federal
Reserve’s actions is limited and bondholders
face risk. Key employees (including previous ones) suffer additional losses, including repayment of some past compensation.
Experimental work has demonstrated that
people are often more highly incented to
the loss of previous income rather than the
potential of earning additional income. If
large contagion effects are suspected, additional government action for counterparties can be taken by the Financial Stability
Oversight Council. In most cases, counterparties would receive a haircut on their
investments.

Contingent Capital is More
Effective at Aligning Incentives
than Other Forms of Capital
Besides the Basel III core capital requirements noted earlier, Basel III and U.S.
regulators also are contemplating other
forms of capital, including “countercyclical capital” and a capital “SIFI surcharge.”
The SIFI surcharge, in particular, attempts
to peg capital requirements to a SIFI’s own
complexity and potential contagion impact

upon failure. It is also apparently the form of
additional capital being most closely studied
by the Federal Reserve. But, while such a
surcharge can certainly be part of a comprehensive regulatory reform, it still does not
tie at the margin to the actual actions taken
by the firm: after the surcharge is paid, the
firm can still engage in moral hazard, and
it is doubtful that the Fed would, or even
could, increase the surcharge once it finally
realizes that the SIFI is in trouble. Even the
FDIC has struggled to implement its existing risk-based assessment. Taxpayers could
find themselves quickly on the hook for
losses without a “bail in” buffer. To compensate, the Fed would be tempted to simply
overestimate the surcharge ex ante, which is
also inefficient. Indeed, Governor Tarullo
created a stir when he suggested that some
capital surcharges could lead to a doubling
of Basel III requirements—a statement from
which the Federal Reserve appeared to back
away subsequently.
At a minimum, any SIFI surcharge
should at least be guided by signals of risk
from contingent capital rather than relying
on a regulator’s internal model. Simply
put, it is unlikely that regulators could ever
develop models for assessing firm-level
SIFI surcharges that are more accurate than
market prices.

Updating the “Automatic
Stay” Rule Exemption
Our illustrative regulatory framework
encourages SIFI counterparties to conduct
due diligence, since government action
might not fully cover their losses upon
bankruptcy. In practice, though, counterparties holding “qualified financial contracts”
(derivatives) are exempt from the “automatic
stay” rule in bankruptcy, allowing them to
close out their positions and seize underlying collateral outside (and before) the normal liquidation process. Congress in 1982
believed this exemption from the automatic

less susceptible to this problem if firms have enough time
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to issue capital.
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sentially the only two methods of recapitalization possible
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the U.S. Financial System (John Wiley & Sons, 2010).

by regulators. Several commentators believe that a
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Slovik shows that over the past two decades,

SIFI’s were able to drop their risk-weighted assets from
almost 70% to about 35% and even “transform high-risk

21		 Daniel

Nonetheless, most attention has focused on contingent
capital.
U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 583.
Duffie and David A. Skeel, Jr., “A Dialogue on the

K. Tarullo, Statement before the Committee on

mandatory equity offering is challenging for regulators to

Costs and Benefits of Automatic Stays for Derivatives and

subprime loans into seemingly low-risk securities on a

Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives,

enforce after a shock, while others (including Duffie, How

Repurchase Agreements,” Stanford University Working

scale that would spark a global financial crisis.” See

June 16, 2011.

Big Banks Fail) argue that they have worked in Europe.

Paper No. 108, 2012.

stay was necessary to prevent the “insolvency
of one commodity or security from spreading to other firms and possibly threatening
the collapse of the affected market.”23 Of
course, as we saw during the recent financial
crisis, the first-come-first-served approach
to recovering collateral can lead to an
intense run on the bank, especially for trades
not cleared through a clearinghouse or an
exchange. Moreover, the derivative exemption allows for a potentially large “loophole”
where non-derivative contracts are repackaged as derivatives for circumventing the
automatic stay. Dodd-Frank did little to
change these rules other than allowing for a
one-day moratorium and banning “walkaway”
clauses, where nondefaulting parties can “walk
away” from their own payment obligations.
Recent thoughtful and detailed analysis
has argued for modifications to the automatic stay rule for various types of transac-

tions, especially for SIFIs and transactions
not cleared through a third party.24 These
changes are likely an integral part of any
serious regulatory reform that aims to
encourage counterparties to conduct a
greater amount of their own due diligence.

Conclusions
The too-big-to-fail problem remains too
big of a problem. Government regulations
to date have fallen short. But a more solid
regulatory framework can be built. Regulations should not simply aim to tame the
market by focusing on one apparent symptom and then the next. Rather, the power of
the market itself must be used to discipline
itself. Contingent capital is one effective way
to harness market signals and encourage
restraint, in conjunction with other reforms.
Its use is currently being debated by the G20.

Successful implementation, however, requires
keen attention to details, including layering it
correctly within the SIFI’s capital structure.

brief in brief
·

The Dodd-Frank Act does not provide
sufficient protection against another major
financial crisis.

·

A better regulatory system would promote
financial stability by correcting the key
market failures that lead to excessive risk
taking by Strategically Important Financial
Institutions (SIFIs).

·

Regulatory policies centered on contingent
capital would offer a clearer and purer
market signal when a SIFI is performing poorly
and trigger steps to mitigate the financial risks.
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